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The objective of this paper is twofold: First we discuss what can be regarded 
as quality in TV entertainment and how it’s promoted or regulated by differ-
ent media systems. We argue that the public value of entertainment depends on 
its quality. Thus, there should be a difference between entertainment program-
ming in public service and commercial broadcasts. A brief review of discussion 
on media quality is provided in order to distinguish the perspective of recipients, 
producers and regulators. We find three different types of quality criteria: Mini-
mum standards apply to all broadcasters, while Public Service Broadcasters (PSB) 
must address rather fuzzy additional criteria derived from their respective man-
dates. Small states impose additional criteria to protect their market and culture. 
To fulfill our second objective, we present findings from a comparative study in 
five European countries with different media systems about the role perception 
of TV commissioners in the production process of entertainment programming 
and their commitment to quality content. We find that commissioners at PSBs 
have generally internalized their programming mandates. They allocate higher 
importance to quality dimensions that address a public value, however, when it 
comes to tangible commissioning decisions they generally use the same decision 
criteria in the same ranking as their counterparts in commercial broadcasting. 
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1. Introduction
For much of the 20th century, common wisdom had it that Public Service 
Broadcasters (PSBs) provided quality content and commercial broadcast-
ers focused on profitability rather than program quality. Some observers 
believed this held true for information as well as entertainment, yet others 
reasoned it would lead to task-sharing in a dual TV market, with PSBs 
focusing on information and education while commercial broadcasters 
focused on “cheap and dirty” entertainment. However, an increased need 
to justify license fees in a world of abundant content coupled with a general 
trend towards converged content diminished the separation between the 
two poles of the TV industry. Nevertheless, PSBs are asked to provide 
public value and must prove through elaborate tests that content propos-
als will actually contribute to a public value (Collins 2007; Kops 2009). 
Public value has become a politically charged concept, used by supporters 
of PSB to point out benefits and by critics to question merits. Although 
the term “public value” is used extensively across Europe in discussions 
about PSB, there is no consensus on what it stands for. In the UK it is 
attributed to the public purpose of the BBC, which centers on integration, 
education, stimulation and representation (BBC Trust 2007). In Austria 
the PSB ORF interprets public value as independence, and a responsibil-
ity for producing culture, education, and high-level entertainment (ORF 
2008). Meanwhile, in Germany politicians, broadcasters and academic 
reviewers in the German equivalent to the public value test ponder the 
extent to which financial efficiency should be part of a public value assess-
ment. In Switzerland no official public value test has been introduced yet, 
however the license obliges the PSB to offer quality and includes a fairly 
exact definition of what is to be considered as such. The national regula-
tor commissions research whether or not the quality standards are met.
Research in this field is disputed. Some authors regard the program 
of a PSB as a combination of public value elements and elements that 
lack public value, such as entertainment (Brown 1996). Others demand 
viewers should be regarded as enjoyers, which ties quality to the task of 
providing the audience with pleasure (Costera Meijer 2005). Neither 
academia nor professionals specify major differences between commer-
cial and public service entertainment. At times, entertainment is seen as a 
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necessary evil to securing the licensing fees (Brown 1996; van der Wurff 
2004) or serving as social glue.
We endorse the argument that common welfare can be the result of 
commercially motivated individuals and firms, however we believe the 
concept of market failure is essential to the idea of public value. Without 
PSBs the common welfare output of the broadcasting industry would be 
lower, perhaps even detrimental to society. This argument is generally 
agreed upon when it comes to informational and educational content, 
however not so when it comes to entertainment. Dehm & Storll (2003) 
show that orientation is another relevant aspect of user motivation for 
content regarded as entertaining. Several authors point out that enter-
tainment programs convey values and orientations that form society in 
a manner far more effective than that of newscasts (Thomass 2003; von 
Rimscha & Siegert 2008). Entertainment that contributes to common 
welfare may be regarded as a merit good. According to Lobigs (2004) 
this argument demands that entertainment programs of PSB meet higher 
standards than the market would provide. Therefore the public value of 
entertainment programming basically equals its quality. Cynics might 
say we trade one fuzzy term for another – however we believe that four 
decades of research on elements of TV quality has unearthed consoli-
dated, measurable criteria. In the following paragraph we provide a brief 
review of the ongoing discussion on media quality distinguishing the per-
spective of recipients, distributors, producers, critics, and regulators.
2. Perspectives on Quality
Recipient’s perspective: Research on purpose of use suggests that entertain-
ment content is primarily used to fulfill needs in the areas of aesthetics 
(harmony, beauty, etc.), mind (distraction, escape, stability, relaxation, 
joy – but also stimulation and diversion, etc.) and social mind (orien-
tation, integration, recognition) (Bosshart 2006). Put simply, we can 
attribute quality to programs that satisfy these needs. However, doing so 
would thus make quality basically synonymous with acceptance. In con-
trast, Wober (1990) noted that the audience uses different criteria to assess 
quality: judgments of liking differ from judgments of quality with the 
latter usually being much more rigorous. Thus quality is recognized and 
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deemed socially desirable, but not necessarily in demand. When asked 
for a clear indicator of quality TV, 27 percent of Wobers’ respondents 
say a program must be amusing and entertaining, while only 12 percent 
mentioned properties such as “informative” or “enlightening.” Informa-
tive programs are more strongly associated with quality than TV movies, 
and entertainment shows rank last. Costera Meijer concludes that quality 
is understood as a genre characteristic of serious broadcasts rather than as 
a neutral trait that influences the audience to watch a particular program 
(2005: 37). Even if entertainment is only about fun and pastime, it still has 
a social function and thus a level of quality in terms of public value. The 
German poet Schiller once described the integrative power of art through 
the sharing of commonly perceived enjoyment (Shusterman 2003: 304).
The producers’ perspective on quality is less researched than the recipi-
ents’ perspective. Quality is scarcely mentioned in textbooks for profes-
sionals. In the 1990s, Nossiter (1991), Blumler (1991), Albers (1992), and 
Leggatt (1993) each performed interview studies with producers to pin 
down concepts of quality. Results show that quality is a relative term that 
has no precise definition but serves more as a positive – albeit vague – ideal. 
Indicators might be found in the technical implementation, in producer 
traits like passion, in program traits like seriousness and relevance, in 
innovation, resources and finally in the reaction of the audience. Producer 
and program traits in particular remain highly normative indicators, since 
relevance needs to be defined and the value of objectives like passion may 
be disputed. From a producers’ perspective, quality is subjective, meaning 
not to produce the most obvious and profitable content. 
From the distributors’ perspective, quality can be assessed by answering 
the question: “How well does a program serve the purpose of the organi-
zation – be it commercial or provided with a public mandate?” In the case 
of a commercial broadcaster this means establishing a solid ratio between 
the cost of content procurement and advertising revenues. PSBs also need 
to control costs; however, the fulfillment of the program mandate with its 
social and cultural obligations should be more important than the audi-
ence rating. Controlling at a PSB therefore includes a quality assessment. 
Even a PSB seems to meet the minimum principle: A sufficient level of 
quality should be achieved at minimum cost rather than a maximizing 
utility with a given budget. 
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The perspective of critics is apparent in the criteria utilized when individ-
ual broadcasts are awarded prizes. With awards assigned by peers implicit 
professional standards are of importance as well as off-topic criteria such 
as sympathy or seniority. Those awards using explicit criteria focus on 
objective formal aspects rather than contestable content traits (Albers 
1996). In general the critics’ perspective of quality is interspersed with 
subjective value judgments indicating a private agenda. Before becoming 
Deputy Head of Programming at the German PSB ZDF, Janke postu-
lated TV critique would need to be political (1980).
From the regulators’ perspective, the statutory commitment to quality 
must be measured in order to render the presence or absence of quality 
a litigable fact. Thus, the regulators’ perspective should provide us with 
a set of unambiguous traits indicating quality. However, the opposite is 
true. A review of the relevant legal texts for PSBs in Europe shows that the 
problem of quality is either neglected or sketched in vague legal terms that 
need to be deciphered (see following section). An explicit definition of 
quality might be misconstrued as censorship violating the freedom of art 
and expression. There are two strategies for noting how this contradiction 
is addressed: Either quality is dealt with at a meta-level when broadcast-
ers are required to establish a system of quality assurance and reporting. 
Alternatively, a non-exhaustive list is included in the program mandate 
specifying which subject matter and which means of program production 
must occur together with a general statement that program output of a 
PSB must differ considerably from that of its commercial competitors.
When the public value of an entertainment program is assessed, the 
different perspectives on quality are not equally relevant. The recipients’ 
perspective can be largely neglected as it can only provide an aggregated 
assessment of the value but misses the “public” perspective. The critics’ 
perspective tends to be subjective and elitist. The distributors’ perspective 
puts the focus merely on the relation between quality and cost. The regu-
lators’ perspective on quality is the only one that clearly has to embrace 
the idea of public value. At best, it includes aspects of the other perspec-
tives. Therefore when analyzing differences in entertainment quality in 
the programming of PSB and commercial broadcasters, the regulatory 
framework and how it’s put into practice by TV commissioners should be 
analyzed as well.
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3. Regulating Quality
It is evident that there cannot be a universal definition of entertainment 
quality in PSB programs as local parameters and the legal framework of 
a specific media system must be taken into account. Media regulation 
shapes the market structures and sets basic principles and ground rules 
for media organizations (McQuail 1997: 521). The typology of a media 
system and the size of a state affect the character of a media system and 
therefore influence the media regulation. The well-known typology of 
Hallin & Mancini (2004) describe three basic models of media markets. 
They distinguish the liberal model (US, Canada, UK, and Ireland), the 
democratic corporatist model (Switzerland, Germany, Austria and Nordic 
Countries) and the polarized pluralist model (France, Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal, Greece). The liberal model is characterized by a relative dominance 
of market mechanisms and the regulatory intervention is low. Democratic 
corporatist countries are characterized by a relatively active but legally 
limited role of the state. Finally, in polarized pluralist countries the role of 
the state is quiet strong. Regarding the size of the state Puppis (2009: 14) 
argues that small countries often have to adopt specific media policies in 
order to enable competition with foreign media. There are two strategies 
used by small states: the first is interventionism by which governmental 
support stimulates and protects the domestic media. The other strategy is 
protectionism in which the state tries to protect domestic media organiza-
tions by fostering, actively or passively, media concentration, or at least 
by not preventing it. In small states like Switzerland or Austria there’s 
an influx of TV signals from larger neighboring countries with the same 
language and the domestic media faces international competition. Thus, 
media regulation is even more important in these places than in a country 
like Germany, for example. Media in small states face more difficulties in 
fulfilling their cultural and social obligations than media in larger coun-
tries. All kinds of political regulation and control concerning the media 
therefore become crucial (Siegert 2006: 202). “A small country can only 
viable affirm its audiovisual identity and produce quality programming by 
defending the role of public service” (Burgelman & Pauwels 1992: 174).
PSB and commercial broadcasters must act on the policies of media 
regulation. These mission statements, issued by the government or result-
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ing from licensing, affect the actors of PSB and commercial broadcast-
ers. Aside from such mission statements, the organizations have internal 
contracts to interpret the normative orientations and goals in internal 
parameters. Both impose these internal contract additionally or comple-
mentarily on employees in the sense of a negotiated agreement.
Bardoel (2003) states that PSBs now tend to have more detailed mission 
statements, but the law does not differentiate between information and 
entertainment. Regarding the quality goals laid-out in the regulatory 
framework or mission statements by the broadcasters, precise guidelines 
about quality are scarce for PSBs as well as for commercial broadcasters. 
The term “quality” is used in external and internal documents but there 
are no specifications about what quality actually means and how it’s to 
be assured by the broadcasters and their employees. Comparisons of the 
documents show similarities regarding the regulatory frameworks of the 
quality goals and the mission statements formulated by the broadcasters. 
The separation of ads and editorial content, compliance about protection 
of minors, guaranteed freedom of opinion, the preservation of diversity 
of opinion and specific ratings are obligations which must be fulfilled by 
PSB and commercial broadcasters alike. However, PSBs are supposed to 
offer more “sophistication,” “higher standards,” ensure programs which 
foster the integration of society, and finally, from an industrial promotion 
perspective, PSBs shall cooperate with the audio-visual industry.
As mentioned before, the size of a state affects the character of a media 
system and therefore influences media regulation. For small states like 
Switzerland and Austria there are more detailed specifications in the rele-
vant legal documents regarding quality. In Switzerland the Federal Act on 
Radio and Television (RTVG) and the Ordinance on Radio and Televi-
sion (RTVV) each devote a chapter to “Safeguard diversity and promote 
program service quality.” The license of the PSB SRG SSR idée suisse com-
bines the program mandate with a quality obligation. Four dimensions 
of quality are specified: credibility, a sense of responsibility, relevance and 
journalistic professionalism (Art. 3 Konzession SRG). The PSB needs to 
define and publish quality standards in form and content and provide 
accounts of its quality management.
Similar to Switzerland, Austria is a small state bordered by larger neigh-
bors who share the same language and whose media is heavily utilized by 
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the population. Thus, a protection against foreign influence is regarded 
as an important objective of media regulation policies. In contrast to 
media laws in other European countries, the Federal Act on the Austrian 
Broadcasting Corporation (ORF-G) points out the public relevance of 
entertainment and calls for an adequate sense of responsibility. A specific 
feature of the ORF-G is the reference to the employees of the broadcaster. 
By law they must be aware of the objectives in the mission statement and 
actively collaborate to achieve them. 
A summary of concrete statements defining quality is and how it should 
be assured are scarce in the government-issued programming mandates 
or those resulting from licensing, as well as within internal documents 
like mission statements. Clear explanations of quality are missing. In this 
context, the nature of a state’s media system has no impact on the legal 
framework. Thus, legal documents of democratic corporatist or polar-
ized pluralist media systems do not differ from one another concerning 
quality. State size in contrast has a factual relevance for PSBs. In small 
states that border larger, language-sharing neighbor countries, there’s 
greater intervention of the state, especially regarding the responsibility to 
fulfill cultural and social obligation of PSBs. 
4. Commissioners’ Quality Orientation
To analyze the quality orientation of commissioners, we relate the work of 
Albers (1996) and Leggatt (1996) who tried to frame the producers’ per-
ception of program quality. Contrary to their studies, we focused on com-
missioners of PSB and commercial broadcasters rather than producers, 
which allowed for comparisons between the two types of broadcasters. 
We surveyed 30 entertainment commissioners1 in five European countries 
with either democratic-corporatist or polarized pluralist media systems 
(Hallin & Mancini 2004). The sample focused on persons who work 
directly for a specific program rather than personnel in executive positions. 
By doing so we hope to frame the everyday relevance of quality standards 
rather than a well-rehearsed repetition of the mission statement. 
1 We use “commissioner” as an umbrella term encompassing commissioners, pro-
gram buyers, and individuals that act as editor-producers for in-house productions.
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We focus on the most important PSB and commercial broadcasters of 
the two small states Switzerland and Austria, which can be characterized 
as democratic corporatist media systems. Germany can be considered a 
large neighbor with a similar media system, as well as France and Italy, 
as neighbors with polarized pluralist media systems. Broadcasters most 
important on the audience market are integrated in our sample: for Swit-
zerland all subsidies of the SRG (PSB) and 3+ as commercial broadcaster 
are included, for Austria ORF (PSB), for Germany the ARD (PSB) and the 
commercial broadcasters RTL and Sat.1, for France france2 (PSB) and the 
commercial broadcaster M6, finally for Italy RaiUno as PSB and Canale5 
as commercial broadcaster. Following Bonfadelli & Meier (1994: 390) 
this sample allows us to compare broadcasters of different media systems 
and at the same time broadcasters of small and large states. We evaluate 
the factual relevance of the legal framework and mission statements of the 
broadcasters in the daily work of commissioners and identify the decision 
criteria used by commissioners when selecting entertainment content. 
Because PSBs must fulfill a program mandate and generate public value 
and therefore quality, it is important to analyze whether commissioners 
of PSBs perceive their responsibilities and the regulatory frameworks and 
mission statements in another way than commissioners of commercial 
broadcasters. We therefore formulate the following research questions: 
– How do the legal framework and the mission statements of the broad-
casters bias the commissioners and how much are they restricted by 
these documents in their daily work? 
– Which decision criteria use commissioners when selecting entertain-
ment content? Are there differences between PSB and commercial 
broadcasters?
4.1. Awareness and Influence of Internal and External Quality Framework
To clarify how the mission statements of the broadcasters influence the 
commissioners and whether they feel restricted by these documents in their 
daily work, the commissioners were asked to indicate the existing docu-
ments in the company and – if existent – describe their program mandate. 
On five-point scales (1 for “no influence/restriction at all” to 5 for “strong 
influence/restriction”) the commissioners were asked to declare how 
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familiar they were with these documents and rate the influence and the 
restrictions they hold over their daily work. The results show that few com-
missioners in PSB and commercial broadcasting are familiar with existing 
legal documents or internal guidelines. Only 28 percent of the commission-
ers of PSB and 27 percent of the commercial broadcasters acknowledged 
there were documents with mission statements and only 23 percent of PSB 
and 36 percent of commercial broadcasters mention the guidelines. Our 
inquiry shows these texts actually are in place in one form or another at all 
broadcasters in the sample. Compared to commissioners at PSBs none of 
the commissioners of commercial broadcasters mention the availability of 
quality documents. Sixteen percent of the PSB commissioners are aware of 
the existence of their companies’ documents on quality. On the other hand, 
18 percent of the commissioners of commercial broadcasters mention the 
code of conduct, whereas only 7 percent of the commissioners of PSB do 
so. A code of conduct can be understood as a document which outlines 
(more precisely than other documents) acceptable ways in which specific 
goals should be achieved. Most notably, commissioners of PSB state more 
about quality documents than commissioners of commercial broadcasters. 
This suggests they are aware of the importance of quality for PSBs.
We found that prevalent commissioners of PSB as well as commissioners 
of commercial broadcasters perceive an external control through the legis-
lator or regulator. Not only PSB have guidelines. Commercial broadcasters 
are also bound to guidelines, for instance the protection of minors, separa-
tion of advertising and editorial content, domestic or European production 
quota and freedom of opinion. Regarding the perception of the “external” 
guidelines there are no differences between PSB and commercial broad-
casters. Small differences emerge only in regard to the guidelines formu-
lated by the broadcasters themselves. Commissioners of PSBs stress the 
relevance of quality as defined in mission statements. However, the effect 
on their daily work seems limited. We found that the individual perspective 
on quality does not necessarily match with the quality goals pointed out in 
the regulatory framework or mission statements by the broadcasters. 
Table 1 shows the perceived influence on the daily work and restric-
tion of the external documents on the daily work of commissioners. Since 
we find no differences between small and large states or between demo-
cratic corporatist and polarized pluralist media systems only the results for 
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PSB and commercial broadcaster are presented. Commissioners of PSBs 
(3.9) perceive a stronger influence of the guidelines set by the legislator or 
regulator on their daily work than commissioners of commercial broad-
casters (2.4). Commissioners of PSBs are aware of the fact that they have a 
program mandate and in some sense also are responsible for the education 
of the population. They do not perceive the guidelines as negative or feel 
restricted by them but rather find them necessary for a distinguished PBS.
In our summary, commissioners at PSB are well aware of their obliga-
tion and feel influenced but not restricted by the program mandate and 
the self-imposed mission statements. Thus, a constitutive precondition for 
quality in PSB is at place. In the following section we address the question 
of how this orientation translates into concrete programming decisions. 
4.2. Quality Dimension in Programming Decisions
We presented the commissioners with a list of 28 criteria that might be 
relevant in the programming decision (see Table 2). The individual items 
can be attributed to different quality dimensions, which are aggregated 
into quality indices (see Table 3).
The results show that many criteria influence the programming 
decisions. On average, only the personal taste of the commissioner is 
rated below the scale center. Items connected to the quality dimensions’ 
Table 1: Commissioners Perception of Influence and Restriction of the 
External Legal Framework
PSB 
mean (SD) 
(n = 18)
Commercial broadcasters
mean (SD)
(n = 5)
Influence on daily work 3.9 (.94) 2.4 (1.95)*
Restriction of daily work 2.1 (.94) 1.2 (.45)
Rating scale from “1 – no influence/restriction at all” to “5 – very strong influence/re-
striction.”
* The majority of commissioners at commercial broadcaster argue that an external 
legal framework would not exist. Only five commissioners rated the influence and the 
restriction caused by the external legal framework on their daily work.
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Table 2: Average Importance of Criteria in Programming Decisions
Criteria Quality Dimension
PSB
(n = 27)
Commercial 
broadcaster 
(n = 15)
Audience affected relevancy 4.7 4.3
Accordance to program 
mandate
sense of responsibility 4.7 2.9
Dramaturgy professionalism 4.6 4.2
Fitness for time slot programming/scheduling 4.6 3.9
Workmanship professionalism 4.4 4.1
Reference to the daily life 
of the target audience
sense of responsibility 4.4 4.5
Rating expectation 
of the broadcaster 
cost-effectiveness 4.2 4.6
Exclusivity relevancy 4.2 4.4
Consistency of the plot credibility 4.2 4.0
Reference to national 
culture
relevancy 4.2 3.4
Artistic value aspects of art and taste 4.2 3.3
Number of episodes programming/scheduling 4.0 3.6
Relevancy of topic relevancy 3.9 4.2
Domestic value creation sense of responsibility 3.8 2.6
Price cost-effectiveness 3.7 3.9
Duration programming/scheduling 3.6 3.1
Reputation of the 
producers
aspects of art and taste 3.5 3.1
Age rating sense of responsibility 3.4 3.6
Topicality relevancy 3.4 3.5
Prominence of the  
director/moderator
relevancy 3.4 2.9
Language relevancy 3.4 2.7
Industry trend relevancy 3.3 3.5
Rating hit in country  
of origin
programming/scheduling 3.3 3.5
Suitability for cross  
media exploitation
cost-effectiveness 3.3 3.2
Market success of original cost-effectiveness 3.1 3.5
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relevancy (applied rather than normative) and professionalism are rated 
highest. 
Major differences within small states can be found concerning the item 
“exclusivity.” Swiss and Austrian broadcasters rely on German broadcasters 
to pay for dubbing and thus cannot claim exclusivity. On the other hand, 
they put greater emphasis on items such as “reference to national culture” 
indicating the need for tailor-made content for self-assurance in a small 
state. In general, PSB commissioners assign very high importance to their 
program mandate. They seem to feel a responsibility in economic as well 
as cultural terms as they rate “domestic value creation,” “artistic value” 
and “language” much higher than commissioners at commercial broad-
casters. Relevancy of the topic seems to be more important among com-
mercial broadcasters; however, the interviews show this may trace back to 
a relatively lower standard about what is to be regarded as relevant. License 
fees allow PSB commissioners to largely neglect the question of whether a 
program is a good advertising environment; however they remain rather 
price sensitive, especially the PSB commissioners from small states.
We combined the 28 decision criteria to seven indices to allow for a 
more clearly arranged analysis. Four indices relate to quality dimensions 
as laid out in the license of the Swiss PSB (professionalism, credibility, 
sense of responsibility, and relevancy) and three additional indices derive 
from the discussion of different perspective on quality: cost-effective-
ness and scheduling aspects derive from the distributors perspective and 
aspects of art and taste from the producers’ and critics’ perspective. 
The indices are additive and unweighted, with every item included 
carrying the same relevance. To compare the indices we standardize them 
so that the maximum value equals 100 the minimum 0. 
(continued)
Prominence of the actors/
players, candidates, etc.
relevancy 3.1 2.9
Suitability as an  
advertising environment
cost-effectiveness 2.7 3.9
Personal taste aspects of art and taste 2.7 2.7
Rating scale from “1 – not at all important” to “5 – very important.”
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Overall the quality dimensions as laid out in the license of the Swiss PSB 
seem to be very important for PSB commissioners in general but in part also 
for commissioners at commercial broadcasters. Professionalism and cred-
ibility (in the sense of coherence) are the single most important dimensions 
for both. PSB commissioners show a considerably higher sense of responsi-
bility and attribute more importance to aspects of art and taste. They seem 
to interpret the program mandate as educational duty in terms of taste and 
culture. Relevancy is a little bit more important for PSB commissioners 
than for their commercial counterparts, however, necessities of program 
planning and scheduling rank higher. As expected, cost-effectiveness is 
more important among commissioners at commercial broadcasters. 
A factor analysis would allow generating the decision criteria from 
the data rather than using an index that does not perfectly fit the data. 
However, since our sample consists of subsamples of fiction and non-
fiction commissioners, the number of cases in each subsample is too small. 
A factor analysis of the complete sample produces distorted results since 
some items are more important with fiction programming than with non-
fiction and thus they level each other out. The resulting factors contain 
only residuals that occur in all contexts but never rank as most important; 
therefore we do not present them here. The small case number also brings 
about difficulties when testing the significance of our results. An alterna-
tive approach with small case numbers is to run a cluster analysis. If indeed 
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Table 3: Importance of Quality Dimensions of Programming Decisions
PSB
(n = 27)
Commercial 
broadcaster
(n = 15)
Professionalism 89 83
Credibility 83 80
Sense of responsibility 81 68
Programming/scheduling 77 71
Relevancy 75 71
Cost-effectiveness 68 77
Aspects of art and taste 69 61
Maximum index value standardized at 100.
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PSB commissioners differ significantly from those at commercial broad-
casters two clusters should emerge separating the two groups. Running a 
cluster analysis cannot confirm the differences between the two groups. 
Either the differences turn out to be too small resulting in just one cluster, 
or if we force two or more clusters, they don’t correspond with differentia-
tion concerning PSB, market size or genre. Thus, the reported differences 
need to be understood as tendencies rather than statistically significant 
differences. A replication with a higher number of cases could confirm our 
results, however it might also turn out that the differences between com-
missioners at PSBs and commercial broadcasters lie in the orientation (see 
first part of the result section) but not the actual programming decision. 
To summarize, we can observe that commissioners at PSB assign 
greater importance to quality dimensions derived from the regulators 
perspective on quality while commissioners at commercial broadcasters 
try to also address the aspect of cost-effectivness.
4.3. Decision Criteria in Commissioning
We asked those individuals who commission productions which criteria 
are most important when choosing a production company (see Table 4). 
The most important criteria for commissioners both at PSBs and at 
commercial broadcasters are workmanship and the reputation of the 
Table 4: Importance of Commissioning Criteria 
PSB
(n = 13)
Commercial 
broadcaster
(n = 7)
Workmanship 4.5 4.9
Reputation of production company 4.1 4.3
Price 3.8 4.1
Personal relation with contractor 2.9 3.1
Compliance with domestic 
production quota 
3.0 2.4
Geographical proximity 2.5 2.4
Corporate ties 1.8 2.4
Rating scale from “1 – not at all important” to “5 – very important.”
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production company. Price is also important however less so for PSB 
commissioners and less so in small states where the competition in the 
production sector is less fierce. Although TV production is frequently 
described as people business (Manning 2005) personal ties with the per-
sonnel at the production company are rated less important.2 Domestic 
production quotas are of medium importance. PSB commissioners care 
more about this aspect, which can be attributed to the quality dimen-
sion sense of responsibility. Geographical proximity is less important and 
corporate ties hardly play any role for PSB commissioners. The regulation 
concept whereby diversity of ownership shall lead to diversity of content 
and opinion and thus quality is not apparent in the answers. Commis-
sioners at Rai do not seem to have any trouble commissioning a show 
from Endemol owned by Berlusconi’s ubiquitous Mediaset.
5. Conclusion
Entertainment on PSB channels can and should have a public value which 
distinguishes it from entertainment on commercial channels. Enlarged 
program choice has increased the pressure on PSBs to justify their enter-
tainment content. The public value of entertainment content can be 
largely defined by the quality of the program. Thus PSB programming 
should have a quality that is not provided by the market. This means the 
perspectives on quality of recipients as well as distributors fall short of 
framing public value since they focus on individual and private value. The 
regulators’ perspective on quality is suited to focus on the public value. 
However, regulators provide only little framework for quality and avoid 
clear definitions. Besides universal requirements, bans and rules, there are 
little specifications on how entertainment in the programming of PSBs 
should stand out. In small states the relative importance of quality dimen-
sions that create public value is shifted. Integrative functions may be more 
important than diversity and controversy, and in small markets domestic 
production is patronized at the cost of concentration.3
2 Maybe the interviewees played down the importance of personal ties in order to 
dispel possible allegations of corruption.
3 France with its obsession for national champions might be an exception here.
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Although we find that (with the exception of Switzerland) the regula-
tory guidelines on quality in an entertainment context are rather meager, 
commissioners at PSBs seem to be aware that they are expected to deliver 
higher quality. They are well informed about the regulatory framework 
and indicate a high relevance for their daily work. When put to prac-
tice this means that public value oriented dimensions of quality such as 
responsibility and aspects of art and taste are more important in program-
ming decisions for commissioners at PSBs compared with their commer-
cial counterparts. However for tangible decisions about commissioning, 
the differences between PSB commissioners and those at commercial sta-
tions seem to be less explicit. Thus we can conclude that securing quality 
in public service entertainment is not so much about tightening rules 
or specifying quality more precisely, but about assuring that an existing 
quality orientation is reliably put into practice. The media system has less 
influence on entertainment content than on information.
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